Global project 968-1032 · 1992–1994 · Refugee Policy Group (RPG)

The central irony of recent Somali history is that a humanitarian crisis (mass starvation) stemming from an underlying political problem elicited a military response. This response, while helping to meet short-term humanitarian needs, further complicated the fundamental political problem -- with potentially anti-humanitarian consequences. A close examination of the hows and whys of this complex relief effort is important because, as one concerned Somali professional put it, "The international community should not be prejudiced against [involvement in] a Haiti or Burundi because of mistakes made in Somalia." The present study covers the period from 9/90 to mid-1994; individual sections: (1) identify key phases, decision points, and policy options faced in the Somali crisis by the United States, the United Nations, and NGOs, and the decisions made in reaction to them; (2) discuss the various operational approaches in responding to the famine and civil conflict; (3) examine the individual institutional roles of the United States, the United Nations, and other donor agencies and the interaction among them; and (4) suggest lessons learned for the future. The study focuses on the major f

Source: DEC abstract, PN-ABZ-357 (1994). This is the source's own text, not a cited summary of the documents.